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Abstract
If a inßation tax base has been created via a Þxed reserve requirement, will a
benevolent government use the inßation tax as a (partial) source of revenue even though
a non-distortionary revenue source is available? Using a simple overlapping generations
model with return dominated money, we show that the answer can be yes.
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1 Introduction
Consider money growth rates over fairly long horizons, say, for example, a decade. At this
frequency, it is remarkable that the money growth rate is positive in almost every country.
In other words, most countries are raising some revenue from the inßation tax.1 It is also true
that most countries impose legal restrictions on money holdings. What exactly, if anything,
connects these two observations? In this paper, we take as given the latter observation, i.e.,
we exogenously impose a legal restriction on money holdings.2 Given this, we ask whether
it may desirable to use the inßation tax, even when non-distortionary income taxes may be
available? More precisely, if a inßation tax base has been created via a reserve requirement,
will a benevolent government use the inßation tax as a (partial) source of revenue even though
a non-distortionary revenue source is available?
There is a large literature concerning inßationary Þnance and issues of optimal taxation
to which this question is related.3 In a setting with inÞnitely lived agents, the Friedman
Rule, for example, stipulates that a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of resources in an economy
can be supported by a policy that sets the money growth rate equal to the subjective time
rate of preference of its agents. In the presence of discounting, the Friedman Rule thus
requires that the money supply should contract.4 Wallace (1980) studies a similar question
1See Fisher (1978) and Click (1998) for evidence on money growth rates across countries.
2Bencivenga and Smith (1991) explain that the reserve requirement can raise welfare by dictating societys
portfolio allocation such that liquidity needs are satisÞed and the real return to savings is raised. To keep
matters simple, we ignore these potential beneÞts from the reserve requirement and focus on the public
Þnance issues that arise when one exsts. We revisit this question in the discussion section at the end of the
paper.
3See Correia and Teles (1999) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for an up-to-date treatment of the
issues.
4The optimality of the Friedman Rule has been demonstrated in many environments with inÞnitely lived
agents. A case in point is Lucas and Stokey (1983) who produce a model with a cash-in-advance constraint
and money as the singular store of value. They use the setup to illustrate situations where the Friedman
Rule is best. Two remarks are in order here. First, unlike agents in CIA models, no agent in our model
requires money in order to make any consumption purchases (only to make investments in storage, but that
too, not in advance). Second, as we show below, the exogenous reserve requirement, as well as the presence of
another asset whose return is nondecreasing in the inßation rate, is crucial to our results. It seems, however,
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in an overlapping-generations economy. In the absence of stores of value other than money,
Wallace demonstrates that the Pareto eﬃcient allocation can be supported by maintaining
a constant money stock. On the basis of the Pareto-eﬃciency criterion, then, we would
expect to see nonpositive money growth rates. Which leaves our question open: Why do we
observe positive money growth rates?
The Friedman and the Wallace results hold in a world in which nondistortionary taxes
and transfers are available and possible. Starting with Phelps (1973), researchers have
studied economies in which a benevolent government may use seigniorage if nondistortionary
taxes were unavailable. Helpman and Sadka (1979), for example, derive conditions in which
seigniorage is part of a policy package with other distortionary taxes. In the absence of
lump-sum taxation, they state, in a second best framework, it may be optimal to tax a
commodity with zero marginal costs of production.... (p.159).5 Freeman (1987) studies
an overlapping generations model almost identical to ours but restricts attention to Þnding
utility-maximizing policies in a world in which seigniorage is the governments only revenue
source. He shows that the optimal policy is to set the reserve requirement at the minimum
feasible level and inßate the money stock away at an inÞnite rate. In essence, Freemans
optimal monetary policy mimics a nondistortionary tax by conÞscating the agents forced
holding of real money balances. Freemans analysis, however, cannot account for why we
observe positive (but Þnite) money growth rates around the world.
In this paper, we directly extend both the Helpman-Sadka analysis, and the work by
that were we to add a CIA constraint alongside an exogenous reserve requirement, our results would still go
through.
5Helpman and Sadka (1979) use an overlapping generations framework. They present two versions of
their model, one in which money is the only store of value and is held because there is no second period
income, and one in which money co-exists with bonds and is held because it enters the preferences of agents
in the tradition of Sidrauski (1967). If lump-sum taxes were available in their world, then it is apparent
that in both the versions (especially the latter), the use of seigniorage would not be desirable. The reason
we can demonstrate desirability of seigniorage is that we have a Þxed unremovable distortion in the form
of a binding legal restriction which forces agents to hold some units of a return-dominated asset. In other
words, how the rate of return dominance problem of money is solved by Helpman and Sadka, namely putting
money in the utility function, matters crucially. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing the Helpman
and Sadka paper to our attention, and for suggesting the above line of thinking.
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Freeman (1987). We extend the Freeman setup by allowing the government access to lump-
sum taxation alongside seigniorage. Like Freeman, money is valued because it satisÞes a legal
restriction; unlike Freeman, the legal restriction is not a choice variable for the government.
We extend the Helpman and Sadka setup by letting the government raise revenue by means
of nondistorting taxes. Unlike them, we solve the return-dominance problem by Þxing a
reserve requirement. Our exercise is a classic application of the theorem of the second best.
Indeed, as Woodford (1990) states, ...in the presence of additional distortions, no available
policy may achieve a Þrst-best allocation, and among the allocations that are attainable,
the best one need not be any of the ones that happen to reduce the nominal interest rate to
zero. This idea is familiar from the theory of the second best in public Þnance (p.1086).
We focus on a second-best world inhabited by overlapping generations of two-period
lived agents. Young agents receive an endowment of the consumption good, the old receive
nothing. There are two means of Þnancing old-age consumption. One is a linear technology
transforming the perishable, consumption good into next periods consumption good; the
other is Þat money.6 The latter is rate of return dominated by the former. Agents hold
Þat money solely because there is a unremovable legal restriction (reserve requirement) in
place.7 There is a government that has to Þnance a Þxed level of purchases every period.
The government transforms these consumption goods into government goods that yield no
utility to private agents. To Þnance its purchases, the government can raise the revenue
from either a nondistortionary income tax or seigniorage, or some combination of the two.
The governments Þnancing plan looks very similar to the backing plan posited by Aiyagari
and Gertler (1985). To avoid intergenerational complications that arise when tax collections
are not smoothed, we assume that government balances its budget period by period. Private
agents take the policies of the government as given, and compute their own decision rules
6If money is the only store of value, and agents have no second-period endowment, then it is easily checked
that it will never be desirable to use the inßation tax. In this sense, it is important that there be at least
one other store of value.
7In other words, monetary policy cannot remove this distortion completely. One way to motivate such a
reserve requirement is to imagine that the government requires it for, say, reasons of deposit insurance or
to stabilize short-run interest rates. We are however focusing solely on the (possibly) indirect public finance
consequences of such a restriction.
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regarding how much to consume in each period. The government, in turn, takes these
policy reaction functions as given, and chooses the mix of the inßation tax and the non-
distortionary tax, so as to maximize the welfare of a representative agent in a stationary
setting. Whatever part of its spending is not backed by taxes, is backed by seigniorage. Our
question then is: will such a government ever wish to use the inßation tax as a revenue-raising
tool?8
Our main result is that a benevolent government would raise some positive fraction of
its revenue from the inßation tax even when a nondistortionary tax is available. Our model
economy is very stripped down, permitting us to focus see how the public-Þnance issue enters
into the decision problem. To illustrate this point, suppose the government increases the
portion of its spending Þnanced by nondistortionary taxes, eﬀectively decreasing the fraction
of spending Þnanced by seigniorage. Money growth rates are lowered as a consequence.9
With slower money growth, there is an increase in the real return to savings. A welfare
tension emerges if saving is positively related to the real return. On the one hand, savings
rise in response to higher real returns. On the other hand, the increase in tax payments
when young result in less Þrst-period disposable income, thereby reducing the quantity of
saving. On balance, the equilibrium quantity of saving may increase or decrease in response
to an increase in the tax-responsibility parameter. Agents may then trade-oﬀ Þrst period
with second period utility. Hence, complete reliance on the nondistortionary income tax may
not be such a good idea.
Our results illustrate Woodfords point. The policy that supports the highest attainable
(stationary) welfare level in the second-best world need not be the policy that supports
the Pareto eﬃcient outcome. Here, the legal restriction distorts the price of second-period
consumption, relative to Þrst period. In other words, young agents receive a lower return
on their intermediated savings than they would have in an undistorted economy. In a sense,
8Notice that the Pareto eﬃcient policy here clearly is to contract the money stock so that money and the
linear storage technology oﬀer the same return. We are, however, searching among policies that maximize
stationary lifetime utility; these may or may not be Pareto eﬃcient. We will also be ignoring the welfare of
the initial old in our welfare assessments.
9It is the presence of the legal restriction that connects the choice of tax-responsibility parameter with
the money growth rate. This connection plays a crucial role in obtaining our results.
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their old-age income is being taxed by the inßation tax. By shifting the tax burden from the
young to the old, the inßation tax may reduce the tax burden on the young, which may be
a welfare enhancing move.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria. We turn to numerical analyses in Section
4 to solve the model economy for cases in which the analytical results are ambiguous. We
conclude in Section 5
2 The Model Economy
The economy is a modiÞed version of Cass and Yaaris (1967) overlapping generations econ-
omy. There is an inÞnite sequence of periods indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, ... Agents live for two
periods. In addition, there is a government that is inÞnitely lived. There is no population
growth.
Each agent is endowed with y units of a perishable consumption good only when young.
Each agent born at date t ≥ 1 has the same preferences over their young-age and old-age
consumption summarized by a time-separable utility function,
U(c1t, c2t+1) = u(c1t) + v(c2t+1), (1)
where c1t denotes the consumption by a young agent born at date t, and c2t+1 denotes
consumption by that agent when old. We assume that u and v are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave; formally, u0, v0 ≥ 0, u00, v00 < 0, limc1→0 [u0 (c1)] = ∞,
limc2→0 [v
0 (c2)] =∞.
Agents have access to two private vehicles for income transfer over time: a linear storage
technology and money. Each unit of the consumption good placed into storage at date t
yields x > 1 units of the consumption good at date t + 1. Let pt denote the time t price
level. Because Þat money does not pay any explicit interest, its gross real return between
t and t + 1 is pt
pt+1
. Throughout this analysis, we restrict our attention to equilibria where
money is dominated in rate of return, or x > pt
pt+1
.
We assume that all storage activity is intermediated. SpeciÞcally, there is a composite
asset, called deposits, that are sold by banks. Banks operate in a perfectly competitive
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environment, taking the price of deposits and the gross real return on storage goods as given.
There is no cost to creating these deposits. Let the gross real return on deposits between t
and t+ 1 be represented by rt.
We assume that banks are subject to a standard reserve requirement: banks are required
to hold money balances worth at least γ goods for each unit deposited with them.10 With
x > pt
pt+1
, the reserve requirement will be binding in equilibrium. Let m denote nominal
money balances per young person. Then, mt = γptdt holds. Consequently, the gross real
return to deposits is a weighted average of the returns to storage and money, the weights
being pinned down by the reserve requirement ratio. Formally,
rt = (1− γ)x+ γ pt
pt+1
. (2)
The government purchase g units of the consumption good each period. The consumption
good is then transformed into a government good. For simplicity, we assume the government
good yields no utility to the agent. Government goods are destroyed at the end of the period
in which they are acquired. The revenue needed to fund government spending comes from the
revenues raised by the two wings of the government, the treasury and the central bank. The
former collects lump-sum taxes from the young. The latter controls the nominal money stock,
M , contributing to the governments revenue needs by creating money. Let φ denote the
fraction of the governments spending that lump-sum taxes will cover (henceforth, referred
to as the tax-responsibility parameter). Throughout our analyses, we focus on cases in which
the government picks φ to maximize the welfare of future generations in a stationary setting.
Let τ be the quantity of goods that each young person pays in the form of a lump-sum
tax. The representative agent born at date t ≥ 1 Þnds non-negative combinations of c1 and
c2 such that (1) is maximized subject to the following per-period budget constraints:
y ≥ c1t + dt + τ t,
and
rtdt ≥ c2t+1.
10Our formulation of the reserve requirement is standard and follows Freeman (1987) and Woodford (1990;
appendix A.4). The government faces a Þxed, time-invariant γ.
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The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the program yields a solution for the quantity of
deposits, d(.), that is deÞned as
d(.) = argmax [u(y − τ − d) + v(rd)] . (3)
The government budget constraint is represented (in per-young person terms) as
g = τ t +
mt −mt−1
pt
. (4)
Let τ t = φg and
³
mt−mt−1
pt
´
= (1− φ) g.11 The special case, φ = 1, is the Ricardian case
(see Sargent [1982]) in which taxes fully back the level of government spending. In contrast,
with φ = 0, the governments spending is funded entirely through money creation.12 The
government chooses φ to maximize a representative agents lifetime welfare in a stationary
setting.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that nominal money growth is dictated by the rule,
Mt = θMt−1, where θ is the gross rate of money growth. It is straightforward to show that
money growth plays a role in government Þnancing whenever φ > 0. In equilibrium, the
government budget constraint (4) may be rewritten as:
g = τ t +
mt
pt
µ
1− 1
θ
¶
. (5)
Here, θ is endogenous in the sense that changes in φ will prompt the central bank to adjust
θ in order to satisfy (5) for all t ≥ 1.
3 Equilibrium
A valid perfect-foresight monetary competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of allo-
cations, {c1t} , {c2t} , and prices, {pt} , {rt} for t = 1, 2, 3, ...such that
11We do not restrict the value of φ to the [0, 1] interval. φ < 0 is equivalent to a case in which the money
stock shrinks; then, lump-sum taxes would have to cover both the spending and the loss in seigniorage
revenue. Below, we will show that, at least for the range of the parameter space we consider, the equilibrium
value of φ will lie in the interior of the unit interval.
12Our interpretation of φ is close to Aiyagari and Gertlers (1985) notion of backing of government bonds.
Ours diﬀers in the sense that we restrict the government to a balanced budget at each date.
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1. taking y, τ , g, x, γ, θ, p, and r as given, the agents optimal savings behavior is deÞned
by (3),
2. banks maximize the gross real return to deposits, taking x, γ, and pt−1
pt
as given;
3. markets clear; that is, y = c1t + c2t, mtpt = γdt, and (5) is satisÞed.
In addition, dt, rt, and pt must be positive at all dates, and x >
pt−1
pt
must hold.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the agents problem is:
u0(c1t) = rtv0(c2t+1). (6)
Equation (6) is a standard Euler equation; the agent chooses c1 such that the marginal utility
lost from foregoing a little bit of consumption when young is exactly equal to the marginal
utility gained from adding to consumption when old. In a competitive setting, banks
maximize proÞts when rt = (1− γ)x + γ pt−1pt . The equilibrium decision rule for deposits
is implicitly deÞned by (6), the agents budget constraint, and the constraint, τ = φg, as
follows:
d = d(r; y,φ, g). (7)
Throughout our analysis, we focus only on stationary equilibria.13 In steady states, the
money market clearing condition implies that pt
pt−1
= 1
θ
. Thus, r = (1− γ) x + γ
θ
. Since the
central banks revenue responsibility is deÞned by γd
¡
1− 1
θ
¢
= (1− φ) g, it is easy to see
that
r ≡ r(φ) = (1− γ) x+ γ
·
1− (1− φ) g
γd
¸
. (8)
The functions, r(.) and d (.), are the starting points for an analysis of the welfare eﬀects
associated with changes in the tax-responsibility parameter. Note that (8) and (7) jointly
determine the gross real return to deposits and the equilibrium level of deposits.
13We relegate the investigation of dynamical equilibria to Appendix A.
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3.1 Welfare
The steady state level of welfare for all future generations is obtained by substituting the
equilibrium decision rules into the agents utility function. Formally,
W (φ) = u{y − d(y,φ, r(.))− φg}+ v{r(.)d(y,φ, r(.))} (9)
From (9), the reader can see the diﬀerent channels through which changes in the tax re-
sponsibility parameter aﬀect lifetime welfare. In addition to the direct impact, there are two
channels reßecting the general equilibrium eﬀects that changes in φ have on welfare. We
begin with brief overview of each.
The direct eﬀect is captured by the last term inside u (.). Here, an increase in the
tax-responsibility parameter, for example, results in a decline in the agents Þrst-period
disposable income. If things stopped here, lifetime welfare would be decreasing in the tax-
Þnance responsibility. As such, agents would prefer that all the revenue responsibility be
borne by the central bank, that is, seigniorage would be the preferred way to Þnance the
government spending.
General-equilibrium eﬀects, however, complicate any assessment of the impacts on life-
time welfare. Indeed, both the equilibrium level of deposits and the equilibrium gross real
return to deposits are aﬀected by changes in the tax-responsibility parameter. Suppose for
now that deposits are invariant to changes in φ. Equation (8) indicates that an increase in
tax-Þnance responsibility results in a higher gross real return to deposits, holding the level
of deposits constant. The intuition behind this is straightforward. With non-distortionary
taxes bearing a larger share of the Þnancing, money creation supports a smaller portion.
With constant deposits, the economy is on the good side of the seigniorage Laﬀer curve;
hence, the government budget constraint is satisÞed at a lower money growth rate. With a
decline in the money growth rate, the gross real return to deposits increases. It follows then
from the Þrst term in v (.) that agents second-period consumption would increase. Hence,
an increase in the tax-responsibility parameter results in raising old-age utility.
In general, the equilibrium level of deposits will vary with φ. Indeed, the eﬀect on deposits
further muddles our eﬀorts to assign a direction of change to lifetime welfare. Suppose, for
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instance, that deposits are an increasing function in φ. More deposits means that fewer
goods are consumed in the Þrst-period, while more second-period consumption is realized,
shifting utility away from the young and to the old.
To obtain further insight into this general-equilibrium eﬀect, note that a formal expression
of the total derivative of lifetime utility with respect to the tax-responsibility parameter is14
W 0(φ) = −u0(c1)[dφ + drrφ − g] + v0(c2)[rφd+ rdrrφ + rdφ].
Using the Euler equation (6), we can further reduce this expression to
W 0(φ) = v0(c2)[d(.)rφ − g] (10)
DeÞne φ∗ as the unique solution to W 0(φ∗) = 0. Our central question is then the following:
is φ∗ ∈ (0, 1)? Can it be that a benevolent government would choose to use some seigniorage
even when non-distortionary taxes are available? Among other things, the answer will depend
on the size of g. Moreover, since higher lump-sum taxes imply less reliance on seigniorage,
the money growth rate should fall with an increase in the tax-responsibility parameter; as
such, the return to deposits should go up (i.e., it seems likely that rφ > 0 holds). Given the
generality of the setup, however, a clearer answer to our question requires us to use speciÞc
functional forms.
4 Computational experiments
In this section, the objective is to quantify the eﬀects that diﬀerent values of the tax-
responsibility parameter have on the agents decisions. In particular, our goal here will
be to study the following question: if a benevolent government wants to choose a value for
φ that maximizes the lifetime utility of a representative agent, what value would it choose?
Our numerical analyses will permit us to assess whether an interior value for φ may be
chosen, i.e., whether the inßation tax will be employed alongside a non-distortionary tax. In
order to proceed further, we Þrst specify preferences in an additive log form, and compute
the decision rules.
14In what follows, we introduce the notation Xy ≡ ∂X∂y .
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4.1 Example with log utility
The utility function is represented as follows:
U(c1, c2) = ln(c1) + ln(c2) (11)
For this speciÞcation, the decision rule for deposits is:
d =
y − τ
2
With τ = φg, this reduces to
d =
y − φg
2
. (12)
A suﬃcient condition for an interior solution to deposits is that y > g which we shall assume
henceforth.
Also,
r = (1− γ)x+ γ
·
1− (1− φ)g
γd
¸
= (1− γ)x+ γ
"
1− (1− φ)g
γ
¡
y−φg
2
¢# .
Substitute (12) into the agents budget constraints when young, yielding
c1 = y − d− τ = y − φg
2
.
To derive the equilibrium decision rule for old-age consumption, Þrst substitute for r to
obtain
c2 = rd =
½
(1− γ)x+ γ
·
1− (1− φ)g
γd
¸¾
d = (1− γ)xd+ γd− (1− φ)g
then substitute for d, yielding
c2 = (1− γ)x
µ
y − φg
2
¶
+ γ
µ
y − φg
2
¶
− (1− φ)g.
Thus, steady state welfare is given by
W (φ) = ln
·
y − φg
2
¸
+ ln
½
(1− γ)x
µ
y − φg
2
¶
+ γ
µ
y − φg
2
¶
− (1− φ)g
¾
. (13)
The government chooses φ to maximize W (φ). The Þrst order conditions for an interior
solution (c∗1, c
∗
2) set
c∗2
c∗1
= 2− γ − (1− γ)x.
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From (6), we also know that c∗2 = rc
∗
1. Then,
r = 2− γ − (1− γ)x.
Notice that, as long as γ > 0 holds, r < 1 < x holds. This implies that c∗1 > c
∗
2. Recall that,
in the absence of a reserve requirement, c∗2 = xc
∗
1 (x > 1) would imply that c
∗
1 < c
∗
2.
15 In
other words, the reserve requirement distorts the agents pattern of lifetime consumption.
Each good deposited earns only r units next period. The young agent, therefore, is losing
(x − r) units for every unit of saving because of the binding reserve requirement. It is in
this sense, that the old agents are getting taxed, once the inßation tax is being used. This
potentially reduces the tax burden on the young which may be welfare-enhancing.
The following proposition computes the exact expression for the utility-maximizing φ.
Proposition 1 Suppose
γ > γ =
g
y
1− x + 1.
Then, a)
φ∗ =
g − y [x+ γ(1− x)− 1]
g[2− x+ γ(x− 1)] , (14)
and
b)
φ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
This result requires that a minimum size reserve requirement be in place.16 With γ > γ,
is, then Proposition 1 states that, given log utility, a benevolent government would always
choose to make some use of the inßation tax even when non-distortionary taxes were avail-
able.
15Put diﬀerently, the binding reserve requirement converts a dynamically eﬃcient economy (x > 1) to a
dynamically ineﬃcient economy, (r < 1 < x) .
16To get a sense of what this minimum has to be, consider some plausible values of g, y, and x taken from
long-run averaged US data. If we set g/y = 0.2 (the postwar average) and x = 1.02, then γˆ < 0. Clearly as x
rises, γˆ increases. So ones interpretation of the real return in this model will have a lot to do with whether
the condition will be satisÞed in real-world economies. For the parameters listed above, suppose in addition
that γ = 0.1. Then, for these values of the parameters, φ∗ = 0.93 implying that about 7% of government
spending would be raised via seigniorage in the model economy.
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To see the intuition behind the minimum reserve requirement, notice that the reserve
requirement is just a device that creates a wedge between the return to storage (the asset
agents would like to accumulate) and the return to deposits (the asset agents can accu-
mulate). In fact, ceteris paribus, as γ increases, the wedge increases (the weight on the
dominated asset, money, increases). However, at the same time, the increase in γ causes the
money growth rate to fall, thereby raising the return to money.17 For tiny values of the initial
reserve requirement, it is thus possible that the two eﬀects cancel each other, leaving the
overall return to savings unaﬀected. However, with γ > γ, the distortion to the real return
is now large enough; the overall return to savings starts to fall, which causes second-period
income (and consumption) to fall.18 For consumption-smoothing reasons, agents would want
to shift some income from the Þrst period onto the second. An increase in their Þrst-period
tax reduces their after-tax Þrst-period income which decreases their savings. Consequently,
φ rises. Notice that a decrease in savings reduces the base for the inßation tax, reduces
the seigniorage revenue, and reduces the money growth rate, thereby raising the return to
deposits, restoring a smooth consumption proÞle.
Corollary 2 With log utility, the monetary policy that maximizes steady state welfare is one
in which the money stock expands ( θ > 1).
Here then is a normative explanation for our initial question: why do we see money
stocks growing almost everywhere around the world. The novelty here is that we provide a
normative reason for why money growth rates may be positive, as compared to the Friedman
Rule literature which suggests a normative reason for why they ought to be negative.
The following lemma characterizes some comparative static properties of this equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The welfare-maximizing tax-responsibility parameter, φ∗ is a) increasing in γ, b)
decreasing in x, and c) increasing in g
y
.
17If the storage technology exhibited diminishing marginal returns, the wedge would expand at an even
faster rate. To that extent, the assumption of a linear technology is not crucial to our results.
18Recall that with logarithmic utility, and no old-age endowment, savings is insensitive to the rate of
return.
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With an increase in the return to storage, the wedge unambiguously increases, even
though the return to deposits rises too. Second-period income goes up. Agents wish to
pass on some of this to the Þrst period. If φ is reduced, the reliance on seigniorage would
increase. As a consequence, the money growth rate would have to increase, bringing down
the return to deposits, and restoring a smooth consumption proÞle. Note that the size of
γ also increases. The eﬀect of an increase in the government purchases/GDP ratio can be
analyzed in a similar fashion.
4.2 Numerical analysis with log utility
For the computational experiments, let preferences be described by log utility [see (11)] and
set the baseline parameters as follows: y = 1, g = 0.08, γ = 0.173, and x = 1.07. We let φ
vary between 0 and 1. Recall that an increase in φ lowers the central banks responsibility,
shifting greater burden on to the treasury. For these parameter settings, it is straightforward
to compute the gross real return to deposits, and subsequently, the equilibrium level of
deposits, the gross real return on Þat money (which is also the inverse of the money growth
rate that satisÞes the government budget constraint), and the steady-state level of welfare. It
turns out that for the baseline parameters, there is a unique valid equilibrium corresponding
to the high interest rate equilibrium alluded to in Section 4.1.19
We report on four endogenous variables: welfare, the gross real return to deposits, the
quantity of deposits, and the growth rate of money as they relate to the tax-responsibility
parameter. Figure 1 depicts these relationships in four separate panels. Panel a (upper
left) shows that steady-state welfare reaches a maximum at around φ = 0.29 indicating that
agents in the model economy would prefer that the central bank and the treasury share
the revenue raising responsibilities such that only about 29% of the revenues should come
from nondistortionary taxes. The remaining panels help to show why this result is obtained.
19See Appendix A for a complete discussion of the existence and uniqueness of valid steady states using
the law of motion for real money balances. There it is shown that the only valid stationary competitive
equilibrium is one with a high interest rate. The equilibrium with a low interest rate is not legitimate
as it is associated with negative money growth rates, and hence negative price levels. Quite unsurprisingly,
the high-return steady state is not stable (see Sargent, 1987, p. 282).
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Equation (10) indicates that the eﬀect of changes in the tax-responsibility parameter on the
gross real return to deposits and the eﬀect on the elasticity of deposits to changes in the
gross real return are important factors in determining the direction of change in steady-state
welfare. Panel b (upper right) shows that the gross real return to deposits is increasing in
the tax-responsibility parameter. In large part, Panel d (lower right) can account for the
direction of change in rφ. Indeed, the money growth rate that satisÞes equation (5) decreases
as the tax-responsibility parameter increases. The eﬀect on agents savings behavior is a
bit muddled. On the one hand, an increase in φ translates into a higher tax burden on
the agents Þrst period (which serves to reduce savings); on the other hand, the rise in the
interest rate makes saving more attractive. As Panel c (lower left) shows, the net eﬀect is
that equilibrium savings fall.
Perhaps it is more straightforward to concentrate on consumption. Figure 2 plots the
decision rule for c1 and c2 for diﬀerent levels of φ. The top panel shows that an increase in
the tax-responsibility parameter reduces the agents Þrst-period consumption. Thus, with
respect to Þrst-period consumption, the increase in lump-sum taxes more than oﬀsets the
decline in saving. As the bottom panel shows, despite a decline in saving, the increase in
the return to deposits is enough to raise second period income, and consumption. In other
words, an increased use of the lump-sum tax option increases old-age utility at the expense
of young-age utility. Consequently, the overall eﬀect on lifetime welfare is non-monotonic.
As Figure 1 (panel a) illustrates, overall lifetime welfare goes up as φ rises up to a critical
level, but beyond this, welfare will fall. As Figure 2 shows, for high enough values of φ, an
increase in the tax-responsibility parameter, for instance results in a decline in Þrst-period
consumption that is far too severe to be made up by gains in second-period consumption.
This welfare result itself is somewhat counterintuitive. After all, seigniorage is acquired by
using the distortionary inßation tax, whereas lump-sum taxes are not distortionary. So why
is it that a benevolent government, faced with a option of choosing between a distortionary
and a non-distortionary instrument, elects to use some of the latter anyway? Note that there
is an explicit link between the tax-responsibility parameter and the money growth rate.
Because there is a Þxed level of government spending, changes in the usage of lump-sum
taxes directly aﬀects the money growth rate that the central bank can set, which indirectly
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changes the relative price of Þrst and second period consumption. Changes in the reliance on
seigniorage has similar distorting eﬀects. As such, it becomes conceivable that a benevolent
government may choose a combination Þnancing scheme.
4.3 Connection with Pareto eﬃciency
How does our result match up with those obtained in the optimal inßation tax (i.e., Friedman
rule) literature? In other words, is it Pareto eﬃcient to use some seigniorage even when
nondistortionary taxes are available? The answer is clearly no.
In this paper, money is dominated in rate of return and is being held solely to satisfy a
legal restriction. The loss arises because the legal restriction creates a wedge between the
return to storage and the return to saving. Agents would like to get the high return from
storage but cannot on their own unless they also hold a return-dominated asset. The eﬃcient
allocation of resources from the point of view of the agents thus clearly requires that the
returns to storage and money be equalized.20 This is achieved if θ = 1
x
. But, since x > 1,
this is exactly the Friedman Rule. The upshot is that with x > 1, the policy that can
support the Pareto optimal allocation is one that requires the money supply to contract over
time. In our model economy, this would require that φ > 1; that is, the tax responsibility
parameter is set greater than unity in order to pay for government spending and to purchase
the money supply. The question for us is this: does following the Friedman Rule dictum
necessarily maximize stationary utility? Can it be that an eﬃcient equilibrium achieved via
contraction of the money supply is less preferred to an ineﬃcient equilibrium achieved via
an expansionary money supply?
To answer this question, consider a case (call it Case A) where the government follows
the Friedman rule and sets θ = 1
x
. Then, government budget balance requires that lump-sum
taxes cover the spending as well as lost seigniorage, or,
τ = g −m(1− x).
Note that the reserve requirement does not bind since money is no longer dominated in
return. The return to saving is equal to the return to storage regardless of how the banks
20See Woodford (1990; appendix A.4) for a nice discussion.
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portfolio is distributed. In other words, money demand is indeterminate. If money demand
is exactly zero, then, the government cannot raise any seigniorage and consequently, only
lump-sum taxes can be used to Þnance the spending. However, if money demand is positive,
then, with a contracting money supply, the government loses seigniorage (now, taxes back
spending as well as help retire money), implying that φ > 1 if money demand is positive.
Suppose, money demand is given by m > 0 and storage demand is denoted by k. Then, it
follows from the banks balance-sheet restriction that21
k =
y − {g − m(1− x)}
2
− m.
Hence, (after rearrangement), steady state welfare would be given by
WA = ln
µ
y − {g − m(1− x)}
2
¶
+ ln x
µ
y − {g − m(1− x)}
2
¶
It is clear that WA is decreasing in m. Hence, it is always preferable to not hold money, and
hence not use any (negative) seigniorage. In short, φ > 1 can not be a utility-maximizing
optimum.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In going through the exercise, we
are treating the feasible set as being income less the non-distortionary tax payment. Conse-
quently, contracting the money supply requires nondistortionary taxes to exceed the size of
government purchases. In eﬀect, the agents are paying twice for the government to contract
the money supply: in addition to the value of money balances conÞscated, they must also
make a larger tax payment. Clearly, it is costly to eliminate the wedge between the return
to storage and the return to savings. If we permitted a mechanism to return goods in
excess of government purchases back to the agent that is, a refund equal to g (φ− 1)  then
steady-state welfare would be higher with φ > 1 than with any shared responsibility.
Thus, a shared-responsibility policy results in higher levels of stationary welfare than
adopting a policy in which the money contracts at the rate equal to the inverse of return to
the other storage good.
21The balance-sheet restriction says that d = k +m.
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5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we explore the quantitative properties of a simple general equilibrium model
with two-period lived agents where a benevolent government makes a decision as to how
much of its Þxed spending should come from lump-sum taxes on the young agents; the
alternative means of Þnance is seigniorage. At Þrst glance, it might appear that the answer is
obvious: the government should raise the revenue from the non-distortionary tax. Somewhat
surprisingly, it turns out that for a nontrivial part of the parameter space, agents would prefer
that some of the revenue be raised from seigniorage.
In our analysis, a reserve requirement distorts the only means of saving  deposits held
with a Þnancial intermediary. In such an environment, it is possible that the loss in Þrst-
period disposable income due to the nondistortionary tax outweighs the potential beneÞt
of having the return on deposits relatively unaﬀected. As such, agents may prefer that the
return on savings takes the hit as opposed to their disposable income. This would imply
that the government would then choose to raise some of the revenue from money creation.
Nondistortionary taxes here are inextricably linked to the distortionary inßation tax in a
manner unlike that found in a standard textbook experiment. Consequently, lifetime welfare
can be higher with distortionary taxes even though non-distortionary taxes are available.
How robust is our central result to alternative speciÞcations of the model? Elsewhere
(Bhattacharya and Haslag, 2000) we have shown that the shared responsibility result is
immune to (a) whether the lump-sum tax is imposed on the old or the young,22 (b) whether
the lump-sum tax on the young is used alongside seigniorage to fund a lump-sum transfer
to the old or just to Þnance purposeless government spending, (c) whether a lump-sum tax
on the old is used alongside seigniorage to Þnance a lump-sum transfer to the old, and (d)
whether a bequest motive is operative or not.
The bottom line is then the following: if there is a friction (in our case, a reserve re-
quirement) that cannot be undone by monetary policy, then inßation may be part of a
utility-maximizing package of taxes that includes non-distortionary taxes. What is crucial
22Set g = 0.12, x = 1.07, γ = 0.173, and y = 1. Then, in the case where lump-sum taxes are imposed on
the old, the utility-maximizing optimum is reached when φ = 0.828.
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here is the unremovable reserve requirement which the government takes as given. If the
government were given the option to choose the utility-maximizing reserve requirement in
the absence of lump-sum taxes, then Freeman (1987) suggests that the optimal policy would
involve setting the lowest possible (feasible) reserve requirement and inßating the money
stock at an inÞnite rate. If the government were instead given the option to choose the
utility-maximizing reserve requirement in the presence of lump-sum taxes, then it seems
clear that the optimal reserve requirement would be zero; the government would not use the
inßation tax at all. If, however, the reserve requirement is to be taken as given, then our
results suggest that it is quite likely a good thing to use some seigniorage. At a fundamental
level, this raising of seigniorage may be desirable to some extent because it serves to reduce
the real transfer of resources over time that is being achieved using an ineﬃcient instrument,
namely money.
The above discussion raises a natural question: why would a government take a positive
reserve requirement as given?23 Financial market regulations of this type are often moti-
vated by their usefulness in deÞcit Þnance, and by the necessity of monetizing deÞcits.24 In
our setup, the binding reserve requirement performs a genuine public Þnance function: it
augments the base on which the inßation tax can act. There may, of course, be many other
functions of real world reserve requirements. In this context, we leave the reader with an
unveriÞed speculation. We believe that our central result would continue to hold in a model
with liquidity shocks in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where the reserve re-
quirement is imposed by the government to insulate agents against the possibility of bank
runs. More generally, if there is a reason for the government to impose a reserve requirement
that is potentially orthogonal to the public finance aspect of reserve requirements that
we singularly focus on, then our results would likely survive. Doubtless, this would be an
interesting extension for future work.
23We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
24For a theoretical treatment of this issue, see Bryant and Wallace (1984), and Cooley and Smith (1993).
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A Appendix A
In this appendix, we explore certain properties of the law of motion for real balances with
a view to proving the existence of a unique valid steady state equilibrium in the model
economy. We begin by writing down the law of motion for real money balances. Let z
denote the demand for real money balances or z = m/p. Then,
zt = γdt (A.1)
Substitute for deposits, using the equilibrium decision rule:
dt =
y − φg
2
− g
2rt
(A.2)
where
rt = (1− γ)x+ γ
µ
pt
pt+1
¶
. (A.3)
To derive the equilibrium expression for
³
pt
pt+1
´
, note that seigniorage equals (1− φ)g, i.e.,
mt+1 −mt
pt+1
= (1− φ)g
Using (A.1) in the above expression, we getµ
pt
pt+1
¶
=
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
zt
. (A.4)
Combining (A.1)-(A.4), we get the law of motion for equilibrium real balances in this model
economy. More speciÞcally,
zt = γdt = γ
·
y − φg
2
− g
2rt
¸
= γ
y − φg
2
− g
2
n
(1− γ)x+ γ
³
pt
pt+1
´o

= γ
y − φg2 − g
2
½
(1− γ)x+ γ
·
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
zt
¸¾

Then,
2zt = γ
(y − φg)− g½
(1− γ)x+ γ
·
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
zt
¸¾

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which is a Þrst-order diﬀerence equation in z. Simplifying, we get
γ (y − φg)− 2zt = gγ½
(1− γ)x+ γ
·
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
zt
¸¾ > 0 (A.40)
where the inequality follows from (A.4). Some more routine algebra yields
zt+1 = Φ(zt) ≡ gγ (y − φg)
zt
− 2
− (1− γ)
γ
xzt + (1− φ)g. (A.5)
All legitimate equilibria zt must also satisfy the following restrictions:25
zt > 0 (**)
x >
µ
pt
pt+1
¶
=
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
ztµ
pt
pt+1
¶
=
zt+1 − (1− φ)g
zt
> 0
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of (A.5) yields
dzt+1
dzt
=
gγ (y − φg)
[γ (y − φg)− 2zt]2
− (1− γ)
γ
x. (A.6)
It is also easy to verify that
d2zt+1
dz2t
=
4gγ (y − φg)
[γ (y − φg)− 2z]3 > 0
where the inequality follows from (A.4)
0
. Thus Φ(zt) is strictly concave in zt. In other words,
the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus cannot be ∩ shaped.
As is clear from (A.6), dzt+1
dzt
is of ambiguous sign. In particular, the possibility arises that
dzt+1
dzt
might be negative for some range of z and positive for some other range; in which case,
zt+1 = Φ(zt) would be non-monotonic.
Claim 4 Define
g0 = γ (y − φg)
g1 =
(1− γ)
γ
x
25That is, currency must be valued, storage must dominate currency in rate of return, and price levels
must be positive.
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z1 =
g0 +
q
g0(g−g1)
g1
+ (g0)2
2
and
z2 =
g0 −
q
g0(g−g1)
g1
+ (g0)2
2
.
Then, dzt+1
dzt
= 0 if z = z1 or z = z2.
Proof. Use (A.6) to set
dzt+1
dzt
=
gγ (y − φg)h
γ(y−φg)
zt
− 2
i2 1z2t − (1− γ)γ x = 0,
and rewrite it as
g0£
g0
z
− 2¤2 1z2 = g1.
Straightforward rearrangement yields
z2 − g0z − g0(g − g1)
4g1
= 0.
It is easy to check that the solutions to this quadratic are z = z1 or z = z2.
An immediate implication of Claim 4 is that it is impossible for dzt+1
dzt
> 0 for all z. In
other words, zt+1 = Φ(zt) cannot be a monotonically increasing sequence.
In steady state, zt+1 = zt = z. Substituting z into equation (A.5) yields,
z =
g
γ (y − φg)
z
− 2
− (1− γ)
γ
xz + (1− φ)g (A.7)
Note all valid steady state equilibria must satisfy the following conditions (analogous to
(**)):
z > 0 (*)
x >
µ
pt
pt+1
¶
= 1− (1− φ)g
zµ
pt
pt+1
¶
= 1− (1− φ)g
z
> 0
Claim 5 At any valid steady state z, dzt+1
dzt
|z cannot be negative.23
Proof. It is possible to rewrite (A.7) as
(1− γ)
γ
x =
g
γ (y − φg)− 2z +
(1− φ)g
z
− 1 (A.9)
That is, any candidate steady state must satisfy (A.9). Now, substitute for (1−γ)
γ
x from (A.9)
into (A.6) yielding:
dzt+1
dzt
=
gγ (y − φg)
[γ (y − φg)− 2z]2 −
g
γ (y − φg)− 2z −
(1− φ)g
z
+ 1
Next, multiply the second term on the r.h.s by γ(y−φg)−2z
γ(y−φg)−2z , and rearrange to get
dzt+1
dzt
=
2gz
[γ (y − φg)− 2z]2 −
(1− φ)g
z
+ 1| {z }
>From (*), it follows that at any valid steady state,
³
pt
pt+1
´
= 1− (1−φ)g
z
> 0 implying that
the sum of the second and third terms is positive. The claim is veriÞed.
Alternatively, there does not exist any valid steady states on the downward sloping part
of the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus. By implication, valid steady states (if any) are to be found on the
upward sloping portion of the locus.
The possibility remains that there are multiple steady states on the upward sloping part
of the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus. To rule this out, it is suﬃcient to prove that at the minimum
point of the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus, zt > zt+1. To see this, recall that the minimum point on the
zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus may be computed from
dzt+1
dzt
=
gγ (y − φg)
[γ (y − φg)− 2zt]2
− (1− γ)
γ
x = 0
or, that the minimum point on the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus satisÞes
gγ (y − φg) z
[γ (y − φg)− 2z]2 =
(1− γ)
γ
xz
Use this in (A.5) to get
zt+1 = Φ(zt) ≡ gzt
γ (y − φg)− 2zt −
(1− γ)
γ
xzt + (1− φ)g
=
gzt
γ (y − φg)− 2zt −
gγ (y − φg) zt
[γ (y − φg)− 2zt]2
+ (1− φ)g
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which upon rearrangement yields
zt+1
zt
=
g
γ (y − φg)− 2zt [1−
gγ (y − φg)
γ (y − φg)− 2zt ] +
(1− φ)g
zt
. (A.10)
Recall (from (**)) that
³
pt−1
pt
´
= zt−(1−φ)g
zt−1 > 0 or that
zt > (1− φ)g (A.11)
must obtain. From (A.10), it follows that
zt+1
zt
− (1− φ)g
zt
=
g
γ (y − φg)− 2zt [1−
gγ (y − φg)
γ (y − φg)− 2zt ] < 0
or that,
zt+1
zt
<
(1− φ)g
zt
< 1
where the last inequality follows from (A.11).
To summarize, the only possible conÞguration for the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus is the one
illustrated in Figure 8. The low z steady state is invalid by Claim 5. So the unique valid
steady state is the high- z steady state. Also note that by implication, all non-stationary
equilibria that start to the left of the high- z steady state become invalidated after the
passage of suﬃcient time (since they end up corresponding to equilibria on the downward
sloping part of the zt+1 = Φ(zt) locus).
B Proof of Proposition 1
Recall from (13) that
W (φ) = ln
·
y − φg
2
¸
+ ln
½
(1− γ)x
µ
y − φg
2
¶
+ γ
µ
y − φg
2
¶
− (1− φ)g
¾
.
We diﬀerentiate with respect to φ,set the resulting expression to zero and obtain,
c2
c1
= 2− γ − (1− γ)x
From (6), we also know that c2 = rc1. Thus,
r = (1− γ)x+ γ
"
1− (1− φ)g
γ
¡
y−φg
2
¢# = 2− γ − (1− γ)x
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which after simpliÞcation yields
2− γ − (1− γ)x = (1− γ)x+ γ − 2(1− φ)g
y − φg .
From here, one can solve for the optimal value, φ∗ :
φ∗ =
g − y[x+ γ(1− x)− 1]
g[2− x+ γ(x− 1)] (B.1)
For a strictly interior solution, we need that
g > y[x+ γ(1− x)− 1]
which upon simpliÞcation implies that γ > γ must hold for φ∗ > 0. To see if φ∗ < 1, suppose
instead that φ∗ ≥ 1. Then, (B.1) implies that
g − y[x+ γ(1− x)− 1] ≥ g[2− x+ γ(x− 1)]
which upon simpliÞcation implies x ≤ 1 which is a contradiction. ¥
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